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THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE: TIME FOR THE
GRAVEYARD?
"But if we are to go after gnats with a sledgehammer like the fairness doc-
trine, we ought at least to look at what else is smashed beneath our blow. "
Less than a century ago, radio was merely a means for emergency
communication. Futile attempts were made to clear the airwaves so
that the sinking Titanic could broadcast its pleas for help.' News of
the tragedy was spread by means of printed newspapers and maga-
zines. Today, momentous events are known throughout the land via
hundreds of radio and television stations. The regulations that
began as a means for controlling a "common carrier" of information,
and later ruled a few stations, must now control the member sta-
tions of three television networks, nine national radio networks,
thousands of affiliated and independent stations, as well as the
fledgling cable and subscription television industries.' Rules have
developed with the industry, but in some cases the rules have not
kept pace. Such is the case with the "fairness doctrine."4 By man-
1. Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 64 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
2. Several commentators indicate that the Congress was spurred to
regulate broadcasting by this disaster in 1912, see, e.g., Houser, The Fair-
ness Doctrine-An Historical Perspective, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 550, 552
n. 15 (1972). This conclusion is bolstered by regulation of radio licensing
being placed under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Navigation in con-
junction with safety inspections. See 10 SEC'Y COMMERCE & LABOR ANN.
REP. 135 (1912).
3. Television networks are ABC, NBC, and CBS. Radio networks are
ABC (4), NBC, CBS, Westinghouse, Mutual, and Metromedia. At the
close of the fiscal year 1972 the FCC had authorized a total of 4422 com-
mercial AM stations, 2468 commercial FM stations, 774 commercial televi-
sion stations. 1972 FCC ANN. REP. 1962. The FCC had also authorized 161
cable television relays. Id.
4. Section 315 of the Federal Communications Act is the codification
of' the fairness doctrine. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970) states in pertinent part:
"If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate
for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal
opportunities to all other such candidates . . . . Nothing in the foregoing
sentence shall be construed as relieving broadcasters . . . from the obliga-
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dating a general balance in broadcast viewpoints on controversial
issues of public importance the doctrine often appears to limit
speech through regulation of broadcast licensees.
This comment will examine the rationale for the fairness doctrine,
the obligations arising under it, and the FCC's administration of the
doctrine. The judicial construction of the doctrine will be analyzed
with emphasis on the doctrine's functional role and Constitutional
ramifications. Finally, the future of the doctrine, in light of recent
trends within the FCC and the courts will be discussed.
The Fairness Doctrine Defined
The fairness doctrine is part of a basic broadcast philosophy that
has been partially codified in federal statutes and FCC rules and
regulations. This philosophy is reflected in a statutory requirement
of equal time for political candidates,5 an FCC requirement of time
for individuals to respond to personal attacks broadcast against
them," and the fairness doctrine mandate that viewpoints on any
tion imposed upon them under this chapter to operate in the public inter-
est and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting
views on issues of public importance." A similar provision was contained
in the Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, § 18, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927)
[hereinafter referred to as the Radio Act] which was the forerunner of the
Federal Communications Act.
5. The equal time and balance programming provisions of the fairness
doctrine are contained in 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970). The section indicates
that its equal time obligation applies only to the appearance of a legally
qualified candidate for public office. If one candidate appears, then all
bona fide candidates for that office must be granted equivalent airtime.
While the political and personal attack obligations do not attach to bona
fide news programs, such broadcasts are not totally exempted from the
fairness doctrine in that any broadcast of a controversial issue of public
importance is subject to the requirements of fair presentation.
6. The obligations relating to a personal attack are contained in 47
C.F.R. §§ 73.123, 73.300, 73.598, 73.679 (1973). If a personal attack is
broadcast, the licensee must notify the person attacked, provide him with
a tape, transcript, or summary, and offer equal time for rebuttal. No fur-
ther attempt is made by the FCC to define such ephemeral terms as "at-
tack" or "controversial." To try and do so is to draw attention to the
vagueness of the rules. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(t969) the government attempted the following distinction: "It is clear that
an 'attack' is something quite different from mere mention, comment, or
even criticism." Brief for Appellee at 72.
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controversial issue of public importance be fairly presented.'
Federal regulation of broadcast communication dates to 1912,
when the Federal Radio Act was enacted.' The evolution of adminis-
7. See generally, Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First
Amendment, 10 J. LAW & ECON. 15 (1967). Kalven analogizes the fairness
problem to, "a town meeting where the chair would rule that each speaker
must be fair to both sides!" Id. at 47. A more accurate analogy would be
to a meeting where the chair would rule that the podium must be open to
both sides. It should be noted, however, that the situation of a town meet-
ing is in no way similar to that of a broadcast licensee. The idea of opening
Up a meeting to all those who might wish to speak is vastly different from
requiring a licensee to allocate or even donate airtime.
8. Early regulation was of communication in general in so far as such
affected commerce and hence was reachable under the Commerce Clause,
U.S. Const. art. I § 8, cl. 3. Initial cases involved telegraphic lines, Pensa-
cola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1877) (telegraph found
to be an instrument of commerce); Telegram Co. v. Texas, 105 U.S. 460
(1881) (state prohibited from taxing messages either sent out of state or
for government business); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U.S.
:347 (1887) (state could not prescribe the type of delivery). Federal statu-
tory regulation of radio communication began with the Radio Act of 1912,
Act of August 13, 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-264, 37 Stat. 302 (1912), which
empowered the Secretary of Commerce (prior to 1913, the Secretary of
Labor and Commerce) to issue licenses on a non-discretionary basis which
were revocable for cause. Id. § 1. The lack of discretion was a cause of
much controversy and was found to be total. 29 Op. ATr'y GEN. 579 (1912).
Accord Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1923)
(discretionary acts of the Secretary limited to selecting a wave length
which would cause the least possible interference), United States v. Zenith
Radio Corp. 12 F.2d 614, 617 (N.D. Ill. 1926) (Secretary could not prescribe
regulations in addition to those established by the Congress). It is not
indicated in the Annual Reports of the Secretary of Commerce 1913-1923,
whether any such licenses were ever revoked. However, the report of 1924
indicates that of the 1,076 stations licensed since broadcasting began in
September 1921, 541 had been discontinued. 12 SEC'Y OF COMMERCE ANN.
REP. 191 (1924). The Radio Act of 1912 proved to be ineffective. Report of
W.D. Terrell, Chief, Radio Division, Department of Commerce, 15 SEC'Y
OF COMMERCE ANN. REP. 45 (1927). Earlier reports indicated that the failure
was not due to draftsmanship but to lack of foresight, see 11 SEC'Y OF
COMMERCE ANN. REP. 221 (1923). The Congress itself noted the inadequa-
cies, which it admitted "did not attempt at that time to regulate or to give
power to regulate unknown and nonexistent means or methods of commu-
nication. It dealt only with known factors." 67 CONG. REC. 5478 (1926)
1974.1
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trative law and broadcast technology has resulted in seemingly con-
tradictory decisions concerning the powers of the FCC and its imple-
mentation of the fairness doctrine. Early decisions gave the Com-
mission extremely broad latitude in the regulation of broadcasts
under congressionally imposed standards of "public convenience,
interest, or necessity."'
Judicial deference to the judgment of the FCC became readily
apparent in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,"' wherein
the power of the Commission was expressly delineated for the first
time. The Court construed the public interest mandate of the Fed-
eral Communications Act as permitting the FCC to evaluate the
actual content of programming, provided it did so in the public
interest.' In discussing its power of review over FCC action, the
Court concluded that
(remarks of Representative White). The varioius radio interests had sought
to alleviate these shortcomings through the use of annual national radio
conferences, 13 SEC'Y OF COMMERCE ANN. REP. 203 (1925), but such self-
regulation, although well intentioned, proved inadequate, 14 SEC'Y OF COM-
MERCE ANN. REP. 233 (1926). This statute was replaced by the Federal
Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927), which estab-
lished an administrative agency, the Federal Radio Commission, Id. § 3,
which was empowered to issue licenses in accord with the following guide-
lines: "The licensing authority, if public convenience, interest, or necessity
will be served thereby . . . shall grant to any applicant therefor a station
license. . . . In considering applications for licenses . . . the licensing
authority shall make such a distribution of licenses. . . among the differ-
ent States and communities as to give fair, efficient and equitable radio
service to each of the same." Id. § 9.
9. In FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940) the Su-
preme Court held that so long as the Commission adhered to the congres-
sionally imposed standards, then their decision would not be reversed by
judicial review, even in the face of legal error. Id. at 145-46. This case was
decided before the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 551 et seq. (1970), which now provides criteria for judicial review of
administrative decisions. This apparent bequest of carte blanche to the
Commission was fortified in FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S.
470 (1940), which provided a corollary rule to that of Pottsville holding that
economic injury to an applicant or licensee would be insufficient to dis-
place Commission decisions made in the public interest. 309 U.S. at 473.
10. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
1. ld. at 226.
[Vol. II
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Iblur duty is at an end when we find that the action of the Commission was
Iased upon findings supported by evidence, and was made pursuant to au-
thority granted by Congress.'"
Following the decision in NBC, several courts attempted to estab-
lish the parameters of FCC power."
In 1969, NBC was usurped as the landmark case in the area of
communication law by Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC 4 which
marked the beginning of a new era in terms of the fairness doctrine.
While consistent with NBC in its approach to FCC powers, Red
Lion was the first decision in which the Court evaluated the factual
context rather than simply affirming the Commission's powers in
general terms.' Red Lion involved a personal attack, and the
licensee's alleged non-compliance with the Commission's rules. The
Court held that the regulations were within the congressionally
conferred power to require licensee operations to be in the public
interest." The Court resolved petitioner's first amendment argu-
ments by stating that different media require different constitu-
tional standards. 7 The specific issue of any first amendment abro-
12. Id. at 224.
13. FCC v. WOKO, 329 U.S. 223 (1946) (deception in application pro-
per grounds for license denial); Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga. v. Carroll,
3:38 U.S. 586 (1949) (FCC limited to deciding licensee status); FCC v.
American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284 (1954) (FCC misconstrued the
word "lottery" and could not, therefore, prohibit "give-away" programs);
Farmer's Union v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525 (1958) (federal equal time require-
ment negates state law holding station liable for defamation).
14. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). Red Lion was heard together with United
States v. Radio Television News Directors Ass'n, 4Q0 F.2d 1002 (7th Cir.
1968), cert. granted, 393 U.S. 1014 (1969). RTNDA attacked the political
editorializing and personal attack aspects of the fairness doctrine.
15. 395 U.S. at 395-96.
16. Id. at 386.
17. Id. The Court's rationale was based on Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) and Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). The
latter case involved the free speech implications of a ban on the use of loud
sound trucks and seems clearly distinguishable as a valid exercise of the
police power to keep the peace. The Court failed to distinguish United
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948) which indicated
that the type of media involved would not be dispositive of first amend-
ment claims. Id. at 166-67. For the Court's reliance on these precedents,
see Red Lion at 395 U.S. 386-87.
19741
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gation was resolved thusly: "Where there are substantially more
individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to
allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right
to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak,
write, or publish . . . .It is the right of the public to receive suita-
ble access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and
experiences which is crucial here."''
Red Lion also contains dicta that the fairness doctrine enhances
the first amendment 9 since it prevents licensee monopolization of
an assigned frequency thereby preventing others from voicing their
opinions over the airwaves.2" The Court viewed the licensee as a
fiduciary of the public since he was possessed of a scarce frequency
that should be held in trust for all. From this concept has grown a
theory of a "right of access" to the airwaves.2' This theory reconciles
the rights offree speech of the broadcaster and that of the individual
in favor of the latter. It assumes that since a viewpoint cannot be
communicated without a medium, the exclusive licensees of broad-
cast media must disseminate all significant viewpoints. Since the
broadcast spectrum and available airtime are limited, the right of
access theory would require that some system of priorities be estab-
lished 2-this would necessitate governmental regulation. However,
with regard to the constitutional consequences of the regulation,
18. 395 U.S. at 388-90.
19. Id. at 389.
20. !d.
21. See generally, Barron, Law and the Free Society Lectures, Ac-
cess-the Only Choice for the Media? 48 TEX. L. REV. 766 (1970). Professor
Barron sees Red Lion as the progeny of a first amendment right of access,
Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1641 (1967). In reference to Red Lion, Barron concurs with Justice
White's fear of private censorship in the media. Barron, supra at 772.
Query whether this would not be the lesser of two evils when compared
with government censorship and its inevitable erosion of the first amend-
ment freedoms? Barron also feels that the Supreme Court might in the
future hold that freedom of the broadcast press could be provided for by
statute. Id. at 773. This too seems to fly in the face of the first amendment
since to legislate is necessarily to limit.
22. It would presumably fall to the Commission to establish such prior-
ities based on as yet undisclosed criteria. For an argument that the present
fairness doctrine lacks sufficient guidelines see Note, 56 GEO. L.J. 547
(1968).
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the Commission itself has said: "[W]e are constrained to point out
that the First Amendment forbids government interference asserted
in aid of free speech as well as government action repressive of it.
The protection against abridgement of freedom of speech and press
flatly forbids governmental interference, benign or otherwise." 3
Thus, the fairness doctrine exists among several competing inter-
ests: the licensee's and the individual citizen's right to free speech,
and the right of the public to be informed. 4 It is clear that a broad-
cast may fall within the purview of the first amendment. 5 At the
same time, a broadcaster's license is dependent on his ability to
meet community needs through his monopoly of a limited airwave
frequency. Thus, the FCC, while statutorily prohibited from exer-
cising any form of censorship, "' has denied the renewal of a broad-
cast license when the licensee's overall program content failed to
meet community needs. There is a fundamental clash between the
broadcaster's right to regulate his programming through the exer-
cise of editorial discretion and the FCC's right to regulate him in
the public interest.27 The problem is highlighted when FCC regula-
23. Report of Statement of Policy Re: Commission en banc Program-
ruing Inquiry, FCC Public Notice B, July 25, 1960, as reprinted in REPORT
OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, TELEVISION NET-
WORK PROGRAM PROCUREMENT, H.R. REP. No. 281, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 157,
162 (196:3).
24. See note 18 supra.
25. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
The Court was there concerned with the effect of the monopolization of the
movie industry on first amendment rights. The Court said, "We have no
doubt that moving pictures, like newspapers and the radio, are included
in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment." Id.
at 166. See also St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
26. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970) states: "Nothing in this chapter shall be
understood or construed to give the Commission the power of censorship
over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any radio station,
and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Com-
mission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio
communication." The FCC is to be guided by, "public interest, conveni-
ence, and necessity." 47 U.S.C. § 307(d). This standard was found to be
constitutionally sufficient in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,
319 U.S. 190 (1943). See note 10 supra.
27. See generally Swartz, Fairness for Whom? Administration of the
Fairness Doctrine, 1969-70, 14 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 457 (1973).
19741
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tions create administrative tangles and semantic difficulties for the
licensee, complaining listeners, and the FCC itself.2"
The Federal Communications Act specifically states that a broad-
cast licensee is not a "common carrier."2 If held to be a common
carrier, a station would have to render its services upon any reason-
able request"' and could not exercise any discrimination as to those
services.' It seems clear that Congress intended that the licensee
have some of the editorial discretion traditionally associated with
the press,32 such discretion to be limited only by the public interest
28. The source of many of these problems is Applicability of Fairness
Doctrine to Cigarette Advertising, 9 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967), aff'd sub nom
Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842
(1969) in which the FCC held that commercial cigarette advertising in-
volved a controversial issue of public importance and therefore any station
carrying such advertising must present the other side of the issue, to wit,
the deleterious effects of smoking. It should be noted that the court of
appeals opinion contained an in depth analysis of the fairness issues but
its holding was grounded on the public interest responsibilities of the FCC
rather than on an implementation of the fairness doctrine. But see Neck-
ritz v. FCC, 24 F.C.C.2d 175 (1970), af/'d, 446 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1971) and
Green v. FCC, 24 F.C.C.2d 171 (1970), af/'d, 447 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(armed forces recruiting messages and Vietnam conflict are controversial
issues of public importance but must be viewed in light of established right
of government to raise an army); Friends of the Earth, 24 F.C.C.2d 743
(1970), rev'd, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (automobile pollution parallel
to harmful effects of smoking).
29. 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1970).
30. Id. § 201(a).
31. Id. § 202(a).
32. Indeed the Congress appeared to adopt the recommendation of the
Fourth National Radio Conference, held in Washington, November, 1925,
which had advised, inter alia, "(c) That the doctrine of free speech be held
inviolate. (d) That those engaged in radio broadcasting shall not be re-
quired to devote their property to public use. . . ." 67 CONG. REC. 5479
(1926) (remarks of Representative White). Although debate was held on
the possibility of using monopoly power to close off political discussion,
id. at 5483 (remarks of Representative Davis), it was inferred that dis-
criminatory pricing of air time was utilized to effect this end. Id. (re-
marks of Representative Celler). Testimony before one congressional
committee indicated that at least one radio station admitted to "editing"
matter rather than censoring it. Id. at 5484 (remarks of Representative
Davis). The Federal Radio Commission noted this congressional concern
[Vol. II
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mandate of the Act. On the other hand, the FCC has held that if
one side of a controversial issue of public importance is broadcast,
the licensee must give time to the opposing side3 or initiate pro-
gramming sufficient to present the other side of the issue.34 Failure
in its first annual report: "[Y]ou [the Congress] are primarily interested
in radio as a means of political education . . . . You would be quick to
see the danger if there could only be a fixed and rather small number of
newspapers and magazines published in the United States; you would
rightly fear that the newcomer, the nonconformist, the representative of
the minority, would have a small chance to present his ideas to the pub-
lic." 1 FRC 7 (1927). The right of the public to hear, rather than the right
to be heard appeared to be the Federal Radio Commission's touchstone. 2
FRC 167-68 (1928). In ruling on the application of Great Lakes Broadcast-
ing Co., the commission gave an initial appraisal of the concept of right to
access of the airwaves: "Broadcasting stations are licensed to serve the
public and not for the purpose of furthering the private or selfish interests
of' individuals or groups of individuals .... As an instrument for the
communication of intelligence, a broadcasting station has frequently been
compared to other forms of communication, such as wire telegraphy or
telephony. . . . If the analogy were pursued with the usual legal incidents,
a broadcasting station would have to accept and transmit for all persons
on an equal basis without discrimination in charge, and according to rates
fixed by a governmental body, this obligation would extend to anything
and everything any member of the public might desire to communicate to
the listening public, whether it consists of music, propaganda, reading,
advertising, or whatnot. The public would be deprived of the advantage
of the self-imposed censorship exercised by the program directors. . . . To
pursue the analogy . . . is, therefore, to emphasize the right of the sender
of' messages to the detriment of the listening public." "There is not room
in the broadcast band for every school of thought, religious, political, social
and economic. . . . particular doctrines, creeds and beliefs must find their
way into the market of ideas by the existing public-service stations, and if
they are of sufficient importance to the listening public the microphone
will undoubtedly be available." 3 FRC ANN. REP. 32-36 (1929) (emphasis
added). But even the traditional notion of freedom of the press has of late
come under attack. See Tornillo v. Miami Herald, 287 So. 2d 78 (1973)
(statute that requires newspapers to print replies of political candidates
they criticize in editorials held Constitutional). But see Opinion of the
Justices, 298 N.E.2d 829 (1973) (proposed bill that newspapers publishing
paid editorial advertising for one candidate must publish same for all
opponents violates first amendment).
33. Cullman Broadcasting Co., 25 P&F RADIO REG. 895 (1963).
34. John J. Dempsey, 6 P&F RADIO REG. 615 (1950).
1974]
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to adhere to these tenets can result in the denial or non-renewal of
a license."' The licensee faces a serious dilemma in differentiating
among the various shades of controversy and public importance
since the renewal of his license might hang on the decision. He must
determine if an issue is controversial within the meaning of the
fairness doctrine and then decide what viewpoints must be heard so
as to present balanced programming.
In any ruling with regard to the controversiality and public
importance of an issue, the FCC resorts to boilerplate language
extracted from the Commission's "fairness primer."3' It provides
that responsibility rests with the licensee for determining whether
one side of a controversial issue of public importance has been
presented, and the Commission will review the licensee's decision
only to determine whether it appears to have been a reasonable
one, made in good faith." 7 Beyond this there appears to be no set
formula for determining controversiality and public importance.
Neither are there standards by which the FCC can judge the reason-
ableness of a licensee decision. Defining controversiality and public
importance has proven difficult for licensees as well as the FCC, '
and a misinterpretation of these terms may have dire consequences.
A licensee can run afoul of the fairness doctrine in two ways. He
may be the subject of complaints about his treatment of specific
programming or issues and he is subject to a review of his total
balance in programming when his license is up for renewal every
three years, :l' or upon termination of a provisional one year license."
35. See, e.g., Trinity Methodist Church v. FRC, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir.
1932), Young Peoples' Ass'n for the Propagation of the Gospel, 6 F.C.C.
178 (1938), FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223 (1946). Brandywine-Main
Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
36. Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Contro-
versial Issues of Public Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as Fairness Primer]. It should be noted that the doctrine is still
under review. See The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doc-
trine and Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 30
F.C.C.2d 26 (1971).
37. Fairness Primer at 599. See also Robert H. Scott, 25 F.C.C.2d 239
(1970); San Francisco Women for Peace, 24 F.C.C.2d 156 (1970).
38. See note 28 supra.
39. 47 U.S.C. § 307(d).
40. Id.
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When a complaint is received by the Commission, it is scrutinized
to see if it warrants further consideration. If substantial, the Com-
mission notifies the licensee of the contents of the complaint and
requests the station's comments with regard to the matter.4 There
seems to be no particular format or wording required for the
complaint. The "fairness primer" points out that the FCC's rulings
must necessarily depend on the specific facts presented and there-
fore may vary greatly with those facts.2 It also sets forth the allega-
tions that should be contained in a complaint:43 (1) the particular
station involved, (2) the particular issue of a controversial nature
discussed over the air, (3) the date and time when the program was
carried, (4) the basis for the complainant's claim that the station
has presented only one side of the issue, and (5) whether the station
has in the past, or plans in the future to afford an opportunity for
presentation of contrasting viewpoints. 4 One commentator45 adds
yet another factor to be included in the complaint, the contention
that the issue is controversial within the station's service area. It
appears settled that general allegations alone will not suffice and
that some degree of specificity is required. But even then, a com-
41. Fairness Primer at 600.
42. Id. at 599-600.
43. Id. at 600.
44. In a footnote, the Primer indicates that the required information is
to be collected by directing a request to the station for the same. It does
not provide any further recourse to the complainant should the licensee
refuse to divulge the information. Presumably stations would not resort to
this tactic because of the adverse inferences to be drawn by the Commis-
sion. Fairness Primer at 600 n.4.
45. Swartz, Fairness for Whom? Administration of the Fairness Doc-
trine, 1969-70, 14 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 457, 463 (1973). This require-
ment was apparently gleaned from the summary of rulings contained
within the primer itself. For example, with regard to the issue of controver-
siality within the station's service area the Primer states, "A licensee can-
not excuse a one-sided presentation on the basis that the subject matter
was not controversial in its service area, for it is only through a fair presen-
tation of all facts and arguments on a particular question that public
opinion can properly develop." Fairness Primer at 603.
46. John K. Snyder, 17 F.C.C.2d 611 (1969). It is interesting to note
that here the initial complaint was followed by a denial and/or answer by
the station. The Commission grounded its non-action on the complainant's
failure to respond to the answer within three days of receipt. See also
1974]
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plaint still may not be perfected in the eyes of the FCC.
In February, 1973, the Diocesan Union of Holy Name Societies of
Rockville Centre and the Long Island Coalition for Life complained
to the Commission 7 with regard to a two-part episode of "Maude"
which portrayed Maude's discovery that she was pregnant and her
decision to have an abortion. Complainants alleged that the pro-
gram "espoused a pro-death position by promoting abortion."'" The
demand was for "fairness time on the ground that abortion is a
major controversial issue."4 In dismissing the complaint the FCC
stated that the complainants "[hiave not provided the Commis-
sion with any information indicating that the station has presented
only one side of such issue in its overall programming. ' '5 " The Com-
mission went on to state, that "before the Commission can take
appropriate action on your complaint, it must receive specific infor-
mation setting forth reasonable grounds for the conclusion that the
licensee, in its overall programming, has not afforded reasonable
opportunity for the presentation of contrasting views on the particu-
lar controversial issue of public importance involved."" While the
"fairness primer" requires a complaint to allege the licensee's past
or future plans for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints, 2 it is
suggested that this allegation refers to specific programming within
the complainant's knowledge or ascertainable from the station and
is not meant to establish a burden of proof.
Commissioner Johnson wrote a scathing dissent' to accompany
the Commission's refusal to review the dismissal of the above com-
plaint. The dissent scored "the procedural straight-jacket in which
the majority's decision straps fairness complaints; a restraint which,
Federation of Citizens Ass'n of the Dist. of Columbia, 21 F.C.C.2d 12
(1969). Cf. Lexington-Richland Economic Opportunity Agency, 24
F.C.C.2d 505 (1970) for the handling of a petition for reconsideration of
prior Commission non-action.
47. Letter from William B. Ray, Chief, Complaints and Compliance
Division, FCC to Eugene James McMahon, June 12, 1973.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See note 42 supra.
53. Complaint by Diocesan Union of Holy Name Soc'y of Rockville
Centre and Long Island Coalition for Life, 43 F.C.C. 2d 548 (1973).
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in effect, denies them a substantive ruling until they meet a burden
that, as a practical matter, can never be met."54 Commissioner
Johnson further stated that "it is ludicrous for this Commission to
sanction a procedural rule requiring members of the public to sub-
mit proof of something the licensee has not broadcast."55 The dis-
sent noted that the fairness primer places the burden of providing
information as to balanced programming on the licensee and not the
complainant and concluded, "[w]hile it is true that the death
knell of the doctrine has, of late, been sounded rather frequently,
it seems chicken-hearted to destroy it on as flimsy a procedural
infirmity as the Commission has chosen today."57
Often the FCC drops a complaint after receiving the licensee's
answer letter which presumably sets forth the balance he has main-
tained in terms of total programming.58 It would appear that this
rebuttal on the part of the station is procedurely critical. According
to the "fairness primer," unless the FCC or the complainant re-
quests further information upon receipt of these answering com-
ments, the matter is usually disposed of without further proceed-
ings."5 In other cases, the Commission may pursue a full review and
after a hearing, find no fairness violation. If a fairness violation is
found, the Commission can issue a cease and desist order or render
advisory opinions and rulings. "' Even if no violation is found, after
a full investigation, a station's entire fairness file is renewed during
license renewal proceedings and the Commission can deny or revoke
a license for noncompliance with the fairness doctrine. This rather
drastic remedy has been rarely invoked. "'
In any fairness question, the FCC's scope of review goes only to
54. Id. at 548-49.
55. Id. at 549.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 550.
58. See note 41 supra. See also Swartz, Fairness for Whom? Adminis-
tration of the Fairness Doctrine, 1969-70, 14 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 457-
463 (1973) for a discussion of the heavy burden of proof placed upon the
complaining listener.
59. Fairness Primer at 600.
60. See generally The Fairness Doctrine and Broadcast License Renew-
als: Brandywine-Main Line Radio Inc., 71 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1971).
61. See note 35 supra.
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the broadcaster's good faith and reasonableness. "2 The fairness doc-
trine's obligations are of a substantial nature and are not triggered
by a mere passing reference to an issue."3 In deciding if one side of
a controversial issue of public importance has been presented, the
whole program must be considered and a statement by statement
analysis will not suffice. 4 The fairness doctrine requirements are
non-delegable, " and cannot be discharged by alluding to the posi-
tion taken by the other media. " The licensee has an affirmative
duty to seek out and present contrasting views. 7 It must contact
apparent spokesmen,"6 but may choose the individual or group that
will go on the air. "' The fairness doctrine requires only a reasonable
opportunity for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints and does
not require equal time."' However, a last minute invitation to ap-
pear 7' or a presentation of opposing views long after the initial
broadcast 72 will not be viewed as compliance with the doctrine.
While the counter-broadcast need not be on the same program that
first presented one side of the issue,7 it should appear in the same
general time period.7" Beyond these basic propositions, the Commis-
sion will not formulate any strict rule or standard for judging fair-
ness doctrine compliance 75 or balancing the interests of the com-
plainant, the licensee, or the FCC.
The Brandywine Decision
The competing interests within which the fairness doctrine oper-
62. See note 37 supra.
63. Anthony R. Martin-Trigona, 19 F.C.C.2d 620 (1969).
64. National Broadcasting Co. 25 F.C.C.2d 735 (1970).
65. Fairness Primer at 605.
66. Id. at 605-06.
67. Wilbur E. Schonek, 19 F.C.C.2d 840 (1969).
68. Lincoln Smith and Earl J. Ormsby, 23 F.C.C.2d 45 (1970).
69. Fairness Primer at 608. See Cullman Broadcasting Co., 25 P&F
RADIO REG. 895 (1963).
70. Fairness Primer at 606-07. Equal time does apply to the situation
of a legally qualified candidate for public office. See note 4 supra.
71. See note 33 supra. Cullman Broadcasting Co., 25 P&F RADIO REG.
895 (1963).
72. National Broadcasting Co., 16 F.C.C.2d 956 (1969).
73. Fairness Primer at 608.
74. National Broadcasting Co., 16 F.C.C.2d 956 (1969).
75. Paul E. Fitzpatrick, 6 P&F RADIO REG. 543 (1949).
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ates collided in Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC."6 In that
case, the Faith Theological Seminary, of which the Rev. Carl
McIntire is President, sought permission to buy station WXUR
which had encountered financial difficulties." The Seminary's ap-
plication to the FCC stated that programming would include gen-
eral entertainment, talk shows, and religious programs."8 Neverthe-
less, the application was heavily opposed," presumably because of
Rev. McIntire's association with the Seminary and his past right
wing "partisan and extremist" views.8 0 The Seminary subsequently
amended its application to provide further evidence of its intent
to provide balanced religious programming.8 ' The Commission
granted the transfer application but went to great lengths to reiter-
ate and clarify the obligations incumbent upon the transferee under
the fairness doctrine.2' The Commission was specific in noting its
reliance on the representations made in the transfer application. 3
When Brandywine took over WXUR it made programming
changes that had not been disclosed in the transfer application. In
addition, the station delayed the broadcasts of several programs
described in the application." Substantial complaints were received
by the FCC with regard to WXUR's compliance with the fairness
doctrine 5 and when the station's license came up for renewal it
again was heavily opposed." The hearing examiner found that
WXUR should be excused from the obligations of the fairness doc-
trine because of its small staff, that its programming was balanced
by that of other licensees, and while it violated the Commission's
personal attack rules, no sanctions should be imposed. 7 The FCC
reversed this initial decision and denied the application for re-
76. 473 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
77. Id. at 19.
78. Id. at 20.
79. Numerous community groups opposed the transfer. For a partial
list see Id. at 20 n.7.
80. Id. at 20.
81. Id. at 31.
82. George E. Borst, 4 P&F RADIO REG. 2d 697 (1965).
83. Id.
84. 473 F.2d at 23.
85. Id. at 25.
86. Id. at 26.
87. Initial Decision of Hearing Examiner, 24 F.C.C.2d 42 (1970).
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newal" citing non-compliance with the fairness doctrine" and per-
sonal attack rules," and the misrepresentations made to the Com-
mission." Brandywine's application for reconsideration was also
denied on these same grounds. The Commission stated that Red
Lion had clearly established the validity of the fairness doctrine and
the rules promulgated thereunder.2 Brandywine then appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia began its dis-
cussion by examining the historical foundations of the fairness doc-
trine" calling it a "'common law development' which has evolved
from a long line of rulings by the Commission on a case by case
basis.""' It went on to state that the need for government regulation
of broadcasting arose out of the fact that if everyone transmitted
when they wanted on the frequency of their choice, no one could be
heard. Thus the government would parcel out this scarce resource
in the public interest."5 After reiterating the obligations arising
under the fairness doctrine," the court grounded its holding of non-
compliance on the absence of good faith on the part of Brandywine."7
The court also found "complete disregard" for the personal attack
rules" and again alluded to Brandywine's lack of good faith in as
much as it had represented that it both understood and would ad-
here to those rules." Brandywine's defenses that it was unable to
88. Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc., 24 F.C.C.2d 18, 35 (1970).
89. Id. at 21-25.
90. Id. at 34-35.
91. Id. at 28-32.
92. Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc., 27 F.C.C.2d 565, 566 (1971).
93. 473 F.2d at 40-41. In recounting the remarks of Congressman
White, a sponsor of the Radio Act of 1927, the court inadvertently under-
mines its own arguments. Congressman White stated: "The recent radio
conference . . .recognized that in the present state of scientific develop-
ment there must be a limitation upon the number of broadcasting sta-
tions." Thus whatever the rationale for the fairness doctrine, be it a scarce
resource held in trust or the public interest, it appears that the drafters of
the Communications Act recognized that this reasoning could change in
the light of advances in communication technology. 473 F.2d at 40 n.115.
94. Id. at 38-39.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 43-46.
97. Id. at 46.
98. Id. at 49.
99. Id. at 50.
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screen programs prior to broadcast because of its small staff and
that such screening would constitute censorship were held to be
without merit."'
The court was most disturbed by the gross misrepresentations
made by Brandywine, coupled with an apparently premeditated
plan to deceive,'"" but it admitted that the first amendment consid-
erations were the most serious stating that "any shortcomings in
this area would necessitate our reversing the decision of the Com-
mission."'"" 2 The court began its analysis by stating that the first
amendment was aimed at prior restraints' 3 on freedom of speech
and that such freedom was not entirely without limit.'"4 The major-
ity relied heavily on the scarcity rationale for the fairness doctrine
when it said, "in the area of radio broadcasting, where the very
physical limitations of the medium make this form of communica-
tion unavailable to all who would utilize it, the court has sanctioned
the Commission's power of selective licensing."'" 5 According to the
court, Red Lion had propelled the right of the public to be informed
to a position superior to the first amendment rights of the licen-
see.' " Because of the flagrant nature of Brandywine's transgressions
and total breach of its fiduciary duty as a licensee, the court found
no constitutional difficulty in upholding the Commission's findings
and conclusions." 7 The court did not bar the door to future attack
on the fairness doctrine completely: "As in the Red Lion case, we
note that other questions in this area could pose more serious first
amendment problems. Since such problems are not at issue here
there is no need to hypothecate upon them."'0 8 One dissenting
judge, however, had several such questions.
Chief Judge Bazelon put forth a cogent dissent on the ground that
enforcement of the fairness doctrine in this case was a prima facie
violation of the first amendment.' 9 He stated: "The Federal Com-
100. Id.
101. Id. at 51.
102. Id. at 52.
103. Id. at 54.
104. Id. at 56.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 59.
107. Id. at 60.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 63.
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munications Commission has subjected Brandywine to the supreme
penalty: it may no longer operate as a radio broadcast station. In
silencing WXUR, the Commission has dealt a death blow to the
licensee's freedom of speech and press.""" Judge Bazelon would
have remanded to the Commission for an inquiry into possible alter-
native courses of action."' Moreover, the dissent further scored the
public trust rationale for the fairness doctrine since this fiduciary
duty is born of the need for allocating scarce frequencies and should
not be extended beyond its genesis." ' Thus it would appear that a
licensee is only bound not to broadcast on other than its assigned
frequency. To expand further the licensee's trusteeship so as to
abrogate his first amendment rights is both illogical and unwar-
ranted.
The dissent also notes that WXUR was doomed from the start." 3
As it was, the station was silenced. But even if reprieved, compli-
ance with the fairness doctrine would have meant a slow death. In
order to monitor its programming, WXUR would have had to ex-
pand its staff and facilities beyond its economic capabilities." The
dissent calls attention to the severe first amendment ramifications
should FCC regulations represent an economic barrier to the exer-
cise of free speech." 5 Furthermore, the chief judge notes that the
fairness doctrine would force WXUR to "censor its views-to de-
crease the number of issues it discussed, or to decrease the intensity
of its presentation.""' In short, diversity of presentation would be
chilled. Judge Bazelon also questioned the long run benefits to be
derived from the fairness doctrine" 7 and concluded that the holding
in Red Lion is insufficiently broad to warrant the majority opin-
ion."8 It is also noteworthy that the dissent points out the tremen-
110. Id. at 63-64.
11. Id. at 64.
112. Id. at 68.
113. Id. at 70.
114. Id. at 61.
115. Id. at 70 n.29.
116. Id. at 70.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 71. Chief Judge Bazelon feels the exact holding of Red Lion
to be: "The Congress and the Commission do not violate the First Amend-
ment when they require a radio or television station to give reply time to
answer personal attacks and political editorials." Id. at n.31.
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dous capability of cable television'"' and how it may well dispel all
fears of future monopolization and limited access and put yet an-
other nail in the coffin of the fairness doctrine.
The CBS Decision
Judicial discontent with the strict application of the fairness doc-
trine surfaced in a recent Supreme Court decision, Columbia Broad-
casting System v. Democratic National Committee.10 The case in-
volved suits by the DNC and the Business Executives Move for
Vietnam Peace (BEM) against several broadcast licensees 2' and the
FCC. The Commission held that the licensees were not required to
accept paid editorial advertising against the Vietnam War., The
court of appeals for the District of Columbia in a divided opinion
reversed,"' and held that a unilateral refusal to accept editorial
advertising violated the first amendment. The court remanded to
the Commission for its determination of a constitutional right of
access.' The Supreme Court reversed and concluded that "the poli-
cies complained of do not constitute governmental action violative
of the First Amendment."'2 5
119. "It is a fact that with existing equipment and technology a single
coaxial Itvj cable can carry between 28 and 36 channels of television, plus
the entire AM and FM radio bands and a quantity of other non-visual
electronic signals." Id. at 76. See also Lapierre, Cable Television and the
Promise of Programming Diversity, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 25 (1973) for an
exhaustive analysis of the impact of cable television.
120. 412 U.S. 94 (1973). See also Note, 62 GEO. L.J. 355 (1973).
121. Specifically named were the American Broadcasting Company,
The Columbia Broadcasting System, and Post-Newsweek Stations,
Capitol Area, Inc. 412 U.S. at 94.
122. Democratic National Committee, 25 F.C.C.2d 216 (1970);
Business Executive's Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C.2d 242 (1970).
Paid editorial advertising involves the purchase of a specified amount of
airtime for the broadcast of the purely personal views of the purchaser on
any topic of his choice. The distinction between editorial and commercial
advertising is not a clear one. See, e.g., Wilderness Society and Friends of
the Earth, 30 F.C.C.2d 643 (1971) where an Esso commercial concerning
its efforts to extract oil without damaging the environment was held to
present one side of a controversial issue of public importance. Id. at 646.
12:3. Business Executive's Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d
642 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
124. Id. at 665.
125. 412 U.S. at 121.
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Respondents contended that since the amount of broadcasting
time dealing with anti-war expression was minimal, the licensees
had violated the fairness doctrine. The stations refused to broadcast
BEM's viewpoint citing a policy against accepting such editorial
advertising.'28 A declaratory ruling was sought before the FCC which
found no basis for requiring the acceptance of such advertising, and
thus the battle lines were drawn. As the case progressed along the
appellate process, the fairness doctrine allegations became increas-
ingly less important and the first amendment and public interest
mandate of the Federal Communications Act came to the fore.' 27
Nevertheless, the litigation weighs heavily in the future of the fair-
ness doctrine.
CBS signals a return by the Court to emphasizing the editorial
discretion of the licensee. In analyzing the legislative intent behind
the Communications Act the Court states, "Congress appears to
have concluded, however, that of these two choices-private or
official censorship-Government censorship would be the most per-
vasive, the most self-serving, the most difficult to restrain and hence
the one most to be avoided. ' ' 2 In support of this analysis, other
sections of the Act are referred to, such as the prohibition against
FCC censorship' 2 and the exclusion of licensees from the duties and
obligations of the common carrier. 3 "
The Federal Communications Commission seems to have been
result oriented with regard to its implementation of the fairness
doctrine. As Chief Justice Burger stated, "The Commission's rea-
soning, consistent with nearly forty years precedent, is that so long
as the licensee meets its 'public trustee' obligation to provide bal-
anced coverage of issues and events, it has broad discretion to de-
cide how that obligation will be met."' 3 '
126. The Court made note of the fact that the licensee had no such
policy against commercial advertising. Id. at 118. This may have contrib-
uted heavily to the Court's finding of a First Amendment violation.
127. See Business Executive's Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C.2d
242 (1970); Democratic National Committee, 25 F.C.C.2d 216 (1970),
Business Executive's Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
128. 412 U.S. at 105.
129. See note 26 supra.
130. See notes 29-31 supra.
131. 412 U.S. at 118-19.
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To establish a constitutional right of access to the airwaves would
invoke many new and difficult considerations. Aside from the prob-
lem of allocating a frequency spectrum that is technologically capa-
ble of expansion, there is also the problem of dividing up a twenty-
four hour day. In addition, a private right of access would effectively
allow the licensee to avoid responsibility for the content of paid
programming. The Supreme Court succinctly states the basic issue
involved: "The question here is not whether there is to be discussion
of controversial issues of public importance on the broadcast media,
but rather who shall determine what issues are to be discussed by
whom, and when."'' 2 Not all these questions are resolved in CBS
and the Court itself did not approach unanimity in its analysis of
the issues. :' Noteworthy is the Court's discussion of the fact that
the challenged ban on editorial advertising was not uniform
throughout the broadcast industry.'34 It is difficult to tell what effect
this had on the Court, but it appears to have been given considera-
ble weight by Justice Stewart who said, "This variation in broad-
caster policy reflects the very kind of diversity and competition that
best protects the free flow of ideas under a system of broadcasting
predicated on private management."'' 5 Thus, in deciding the possi-
ble violation of the fairness doctrine by one licensee, the Court is
considering the policies of the entire industry. This seems to erode
the strictly non-delegable character of the fairness doctrine obliga-
tions' and portends a realistic appraisal of the total flow of infor-
mation to the public. Left unanswered is the fairness doctrine's
relevance in light of technological and sociological changes, as well
as the constitutional mandate of the first amendment. The Court's
132. Id. at 130.
133. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. Justices
White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquisi joined the Chief Justice with
respect to parts I, 1I, and IV of the opinion as did Justices Rehnquist and
Stewart with respect to parts 1, 11, and III. Justice Stewart filed an opinion
concurring in parts 1, 11, and III. Justice White filed an opinion concurring
in parts 1, 11, and IV, as did Justice Blackmun with Justice Powell joining.
Justice Douglas filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment. Jus-
tice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Marshall joined.
134. 412 U.S. at 98. See also Id. at 143-44, (Stewart, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 144.
136. See note 65 supra.
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analysis of these areas hints at future obsolesence of the fairness
doctrine.
The Future of the Fairness Doctrine
Of great importance to the future development or demise of the
fairness doctrine is the majority opinion's inference in CBS that the
doctrine's foundation is a purely technological one." 7 A limited
broadcast spectrum coupled with the "public trustee" role of the
licensee brought about the need for enforced fairness. But the ad-
vent of cable television may offer a viewer four hundred channels
from which to choose " ' and thus eliminate the basic rationale for
Red Lion. Perhaps the most prophetic statement in this respect was
put forth by Justice Stewart:
This Court was persuaded in Red Lion to accept the Commission's view that
a so-called fairness doctrine was required by the unique electronic limitations
of broadcasting, at least in the then existing state of the art. Rightly or
wrongly, we there decided that broadcasters' First Amendment rights were
'abridgeable' . . . . If we must choose whether editorial decisions are to be
made in the free judgment of individual broadcasters, or imposed by bureau-
cratic fiat, the choice must be for freedom.' '
The majority acknowledge that the entire area of communications
law is in a process of evolution and that there is, "a continuing
search for means to achieve reasonable regulation compatible with
the First Amendment rights of the public and the licensee.""" It
seems clear that the fairness doctrine must rise, fall, or fail in the
face of changing technology.
As the communications industry has grown through technology,
so have the people it seeks to reach. If the licensed broadcast media
were the sole source of information for the public, the fairness doc-
trine might have some justification. But people today read, listen,
and discuss, and are constantly exposed to all sides of controversial
issues of public importance.' Closely related to the public's access
1:37. 412 U.S. at 101.
138. Id. at 158 n.8 See also note 119 supra.
1:39. 412 U.S. at 146.
140. Id. at. 132.
141. Justice Douglas cites Professor Jaffe with approval: "The implica-
tion that the people of this country . . . are mere unthinking automatons
manipulated by the media, without interests, conflicts, or prejudices is an
assumption which I find quite maddening. The development of Constitu-
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to divergent sources of information is the free speech paradox cre-
ated in an urban environment. In a large city there are often many
more broadcast licensees than newspapers. Yet the printed media
enjoys far more first amendment protections.' This disparity in
protection seems irreconcilable in view of the similarity of functions
performed. :' It would seem that need for the imposition of the fair-
ness doctrine obligations, if such a need exists, should be tempered
by the efficacy of these other sources of information.' The rationale
behind the fairness doctrine is the right of the public to be in-
formed"' and it is submitted that this is being accomplished by
other means. Simply stated, the doctrine has lost its raison d'etre.
Lurking ominously behind the fairness doctrine is the first
amendment. Despite Red Lion, Justice Douglas would abolish the
fairness doctrine solely on constitutional grounds. 4 ' The rest of the
Court in CBS evades the problem by failing to find the necessary
"government action."' 4 7 But it seems clear that the fairness doctrine
and the first amendment cannot share a peaceful coexistence. It
may well be that the Court is waiting for a propitious opportunity
to declare that the first amendment must prevail. 4 '
tional doctrine should not be based on such hysterical overestimation of
media power and underestimation of the good sense of the American pub-
lic." 412 U.S. at 152 n.3.
142. New York City, for example, has three major daily newspapers
(the New York Times, the Daily News, and the New York Post), seven
television stations, and numerous AM and FM radio stations. The Court
in CBS notes that there are only 1792 daily newspapers in the United
States. Id. at 144 n. 14. See note 2 supra detailing broadcast media statis-
tics.
143. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
144. Professor Jaffe disagrees with the idea that the typical viewer or
listener is so insulated that he receives no information other than that
broadcast. See JAFFE, THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE, EQUAL TIME, REPLY TO PER-
SONAL ATTACKS, AND THE LOCAL SERVICE OBLIGATION, IMPLICATIONS OF TECH-
NOLOGICAL CHANGE 2-3 (1968).
145. See note 18 supra.
146. 412 U.S. at 148.
147. Id. at 109-10.
148. That time may soon be upon us. NBC has chosen to appeal the
imposition of the fairness doctrine in the area of investigative reporting.
See N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1973, at 70, cols. 6-8.
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Conclusion
When the "Marconi" was the only means of wireless communica-
tion, strict regulation of the broadcast spectrum was a necessity.
When people received a large majority of their information from a
few broadcast licensees, the imposition of rules mandating fair pres-
entation of important issues had some justification. But in the pres-
ent state of the communications industry this justification has evap-
orated. The Federal Communications Commission will soon be re-
quired to oversee a potential source of virtually unlimited
information. People no longer cling to their radios for news of the
world. Both the communications industry and the nation have out-
grown the fairness doctrine.
